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Abstract
The comprehensive analysis presented here attempts to ana-
lyze “newcomer” states in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA), primarily the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Unit-
ed Arab Emirates (UAE), seeking to implement civilian nuclear 
energy according to their political and economic situations . By 
investigating their motivations and funding resources for fu-
ture nuclear projects, this analysis provides guidance for these 
states in terms of their nuclear infrastructure and nonprolifera-
tion . The overall approach of this analysis relies on the factors 
for the success of civilian nuclear energy programs identified 
in experiential studies conducted since the Atoms for Peace 
speech in 1953 . This study also attempts to reduce the gap 
between developing and developed states by clarifying the ma-
jor challenges involved in nuclear cooperation and technology 
transferal .
Since the 1980s, the MENA region has experienced vari-
ous crises, including the Iraq-Iran War, the Gulf War, terrorist 
attacks, the Arab Spring, and the Islamic State (IS) . However, 
the two states analyzed here have maintained stable politi-
cal environments without disturbances to their governmental 
systems . Moreover, from an economic viewpoint, both states 
have high revenue from oil and gas production and high oil 
reserves (more than 20 percent of the world’s proven oil re-
serves) . Regarding their motivation for seeking civilian nuclear 
energy, these states are attempting to address their estimated 
8-9 percent annual increase in electricity demand, rapid popula-
tion growth, and the need for more desalination plants . By im-
plementing nuclear energy programs, these newcomer states
will face challenges related to their nuclear strategy, roadmap,
infrastructure, and human resources . To address these chal-
lenges, the newcomer states will have to secure intense for-
eign cooperation by signing nuclear agreements with devel-
oped states and showing a clear record of compliance with
nuclear nonproliferation commitments, such as the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreements (CSA), and the Additional Protocol (AP), which will 
raise the transparency of the civilian nuclear program .
Introduction
Rapid population growth and increased electricity demands 
(for both water desalination and electricity generation) are 
major energy challenges for governments around the world . 
Many governments believe that nuclear energy is one of the 
safest, most reliable, and most cost-effective energy sources 
that can provide electricity for long periods of time . According 
to reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),1 
nuclear power demand is expected to increase between a low 
projection of 17 percent (if the current market remains and few 
changes in resources and technology occur) and a high projec-
tion of 94 percent (if the rate of electricity demand and econ-
omies continue to grow) of the world’s current total nuclear 
power capacity by 2030 . Thus, many states are seeking to im-
plement civilian nuclear energy programs . Experiential studies 
conducted since the Atoms for Peace speech in 1953 indicate 
that the essential factors that determine the success of such 
programs are as follows: 1) nuclear nonproliferation commit-
ments (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT], Comprehensive 
Safeguards Agreements [CSA], and the Additional Protocol 
[AP]), 2) the political situation, and 3) the economic situation 
(motivations, resources, and gross domestic product [GDP]) .2
The goal of this paper is to analyze the “newcomer” de-
veloping states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 
primarily the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), seeking civilian nuclear energy . Additionally, 
an overview of both states from a nuclear nonproliferation and 
infrastructure perspective that satisfies the essential require-
ments for the successful development of civilian nuclear ener-
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gy is provided . This study attempts to bridge the gap between 
newcomers and developed states, which can be achieved by 
clarifying a number of the major and initial difficulties that affect 
both types of states in the process of cooperation and technol-
ogy transfer . The presented analysis will investigate the politi-
cal and economic environments of both states . Politically, this 
study will analyze the stability of the governmental system as 
a strong indication of the entire political framework of the tar-
geted state . This study will investigate economic motivations 
and resources from an energy perspective as well as consider 
a general GDP-based perspective .
Background
Studies on the development of civilian nuclear power that fo-
cus on similar objectives are rare, although two studies by Jew-
ell (2011) were found in literature .3,4 These studies performed 
analyses of the motivations and capacities for deploying civil-
ian nuclear energy in fifty-two aspirant states and then in five 
North Africa states . The evaluations included financial and in-
stitutional capacities as well as technical requirements for the 
electricity grid . The institutional capacity was measured by the 
World Bank Political Stability Index (PSI) and the World Bank 
Government Effectiveness Indicator (GEI) . The financial capac-
ity was measured by GDP and GDP/capita . Although the use 
of PSI and GEI are logical and reasonable when evaluating in-
stitutional capacities, both indicators are subject to debate . For 
example, although Pakistan, India, Argentina, Brazil, and Russia 
have operational nuclear power plants (NPPs), these countries 
present low PSI or GEI; therefore, these states have overcome 
the PSI and GEI indicators, met all of the technical require-
ments, and managed the financial difficulties . The results of 
the second study showed that Libya and Tunisia had the top 
two PSI among North Africa states: however, both of these 
governmental systems have been toppled and the countries 
are unstable .5,6 The PSI and GEI were founded on different in-
ternational efforts, covering a wide range of sources . However, 
these indicators were highly influenced by Western and Euro-
pean cultures, which are different from the cultures of MENA 
states . 
Historical observations have indicated that under certain 
circumstances, such as a lack of capability or capacity, strong 
motivations could make up for the required capabilities or ca-
pacities . Therefore, a thorough investigation will not be con-
ducted in this study with regard to the technical requirements, 
which will eventually be addressed through cooperation with 
developed states as well as the IAEA .7,8 In this study, a com-
mon ground was defined for evaluating a political situation in 
which a logical and reasonable indicator reflects the reality of 
the government systems . Although this indicator may be con-
troversial, it is unique because it is based on logic and reality . 
The indicator is based on the results of previous crises that the 
government systems in the MENA region, particularly KSA and 
UAE, have experienced . These results will be further detailed 
in the political situation section .
Role of the NPT
The NPT is a very important commitment and considered one 
of the primary concerns of the international community with 
regard to nuclear energy . This treaty defines the privileges, 
responsibilities, and obligations for the 191 state parties and 
ninety-three signatory states involved .9,10 The three pillars of 
the NPT are the promotion of nuclear arms control and disar-
mament, the prevention of nuclear weapon development, and 
the encouragement of peaceful cooperation .10,11 However, the 
NPT is one of the major factors in the successful development 
of civilian nuclear energy .2 Table 1 shows the date of the NPT 
signature or deposit of ratification for the states in the MENA 
Region .9 As parties to the NPT, all MENA states have signed 
the NPT or deposited their instruments of ratification .
 Note that most of MENA states were early signatories 
to the NPT; in addition, Syria, Iraq, and Libya are currently in 
non-compliance status .12-14 The KSA and UAE are two of the 
later signatories to the NPT . Both states apparently understand 
that any perception of non-compliance with the NPT may breed 
NPT Agreement
States Signature or Deposit 
Date
States Signature or 
Deposit Date
KSA 3 October 1988 Syria * 1 July 1968
UAE 26 September 1995 Lebanon 1 July 1968
Kuwait 15-22 August 1968 Egypt 1 July 1968
Oman 23 January 1997 Libya * July 1968
Qatar 1989 Algeria 12 January 1995
Bahrain 3 November 1988 Tunis 1 July 1968
Iraq * 1 July 1968
Morocco 1 July 1968
Jordan 10 July 1968
Table 1. Date of NPT Signature or deposit for the states in the MENA region
* Non-compliance status
 Source: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affair (UNODA)
 Note (light blue): KSA and UAE are the primary focus of this study .
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distrust from the international community, which will generally 
affect their future nuclear activities . By maintaining compliance 
with the obligations and commitments of the NPT agreement, 
the chances of international cooperation will be much higher, 
particularly if the political and economic situations in both states 
help support the need for a civilian nuclear energy program . 
Political Situation
Political situation is measured based on the government’s sta-
bility . An indicator of governmental stability is a combination 
of logic and the historical conditions, and such indicators for 
MENA countries are developed by tracing the major changes in 
the government system according to the various crises in the 
region . Major changes in the government system have been 
defined as changes in the entire presidential office, monar-
chy, or government cabinet . This study used major changes in 
the governmental system as a strong indicator of the govern-
ment’s stability . 
Since September 1980, five major crises have been identi-
fied in the MENA region: the Iraq-Iran War, the Gulf War, terrorist 
attacks,15 the Arab Spring,16 and the Islamic State (IS) .17 Three 
of these crises, the Iraq-Iran War, the Gulf War, and the Islamic 
State, have not had a significant impact on the government 
stability of the MENA states that remain in compliance with 
the NPT . However, terrorist attacks have impacted government 
stability in Lebanon,18,19 whereas the Arab Spring impacted the 
government stability in Egypt, Yemen, and Tunisia .16 Over the 
short term, the political environment in certain states in the 
MENA region will prevent developed states from cooperating 
towards the development of civilian nuclear energy programs . 
However, the governmental stability of both the KSA and UAE 
have not been impacted by these crises . Thus, regional crises 
should not necessarily preclude the successful implementation 
of nuclear power technology within the safeguards prescribed 
by the IAEA . For example, in 2015, Egypt and Russia signed a 
memorandum of understanding regarding the construction of 
NPPs .20 Therefore, these activities are possible if the stability 
of the government is strengthened post-crisis .
Economic Situation
Motivation for Seeking Civilian Nuclear Energy
The largest countries among the Gulf States in terms of their 
economies are using approximately one third of their daily pro-
duction of oil and gas to produce electricity .21 The estimated 
increases in the population growth, energy demands, and re-
newable water requirements per capita by 2030 are shown in 
Table 2 . The increase in electricity demand is estimated to be 
approximately 8-9 percent per year for KSA and UAE,22,23 and 
this increase will be caused by population growth and industri-
alization . Both states rely on water desalination plants because 
of the lack of surface and ground water . In the near future, 
population growth will drive the need for increased desalination 
plant capacity, which will require greater amounts of electricity . 
The current solution is to continue building additional plants to 
burn more oil and gas to meet the demand regardless of the 
mandates of the climate conference in Paris in 2015, which will 
place additional pressure on both governments with regard to 
energy resources .
Table 2 shows that KSA will face the largest increase in 
energy demand and population among the Gulf States, with 
UAE in second place . Both states are motivated to seek civilian 
nuclear energy because of 1) the expected growth in popula-
tion, 2) the yearly increases in demand for electricity, and 3) the 
need for more desalination plants . To this end, discussions on 
the implementation of civilian nuclear energy were announced 




Energy Demand B 
(Terawatt/Hours)
Renewable Water 
Per Capita C  
(Cubic Meters)
2015 2030* 2015 2030* 2015 2030*
KSA 28.8 38.8 101.0 317.0 83.0 66.0
UAE 9.3 12.5 99.5 315.0 28.9 23.0
Kuwait 3.4 4.5 66.4 138.0 5.7 5.0
Oman 3.6 4.8 13.9 28.9 836.6 350.0
Qatar 2.2 2.9 18.7 38.9 37.0 29.0
Bahrain 1.3 1.8 14.0 29.0 135.6 109.0
Table 2. Future population, energy demand, and renewable water in the 
Gulf States
A, Source: World Bank Data, which include recent (2015) population estimates and 
an approximately 2 percent annual population growth rate .
B, C, Compiled from Report on the Workshop: Nuclear Dangers Nuclear Realities21 
and updated with recent data . The energy demand is increasing by 8-9 percent 
for the KSA and UAE and by ~5 percent for the remaining Gulf States . The es-
timated decreasing percentage of renewable water is ~ (-2  percent) for all Gulf 
States except Kuwait and Qatar, which is ~ (-1 percent) .
* Indicates projected value
Note (light blue): KSA and UAE are the primary focus of this study .
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of four pressurized water reactors,22 whereas, KSA has merely 
announced the creation of King Abdullah City for Atomic and 
Renewable Energy (KACARE), which remains in the planning, 
study, and evaluation stages .23 These two civilian nuclear ener-
gy programs are collectively estimated to cost more than $100 
billion, rendering them among the largest nuclear programs 
of the century,22,23 with KSA’s program costing $80 billion and 
UAE’s program costing $20 billion . Apparently the huge bud-
gets for these programs raises concerns as to whether the 
states will be able to fund these long-term investments .
Funding Resources for Civilian Nuclear Energy
In this section, a general overview of the economies of KSA and 
UAE, which will include oil, natural gas, and GDP, is provided 
to gain an understanding of both economies . The Gulf region 
is an area rich in oil, which is among the purest oil worldwide . 
Additionally, both states have tremendous natural gas produc-
tion capacities and reserves . These Gulf State governments 
financially rely on their production and reserves of oil and natu-
ral gas . According to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), in which the KSA has a leading role,24,25 both 
states are leading countries in oil production . Table 3 presents 
data on the oil and gas reserves and production for both states .
Table 3. Oil and gas data for the KSA and UAE
Oil and Gas Data KSA UAE
Crude oil reserves  
(million barrels)
265,789 97,800
Natural gas reserves  
(billion cubic meters)
8,317 6.091
Crude oil production  
(thousand barrels/day)
9,637 2,797
Natural gas production  
(million cubic meters)
100,030 54,600




Source: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), KSA and UAE 
Facts and Figures24,25
Both states have sizable reserves and a substantial pro-
duction capacity for gas and oil, which will maintain a stable 
economic status for several years . Several billion dollars of oil 
in the form of petroleum exports are added as revenue per day 
to the budgets of both states . According to the U .S . Central In-
telligence Agency (CIA), the KSA is an oil-based economy with 
a GDP of $927 .8 billion and a GDP/capita of $31,200 (2013 esti-
mate), which ranks the KSA first among the Gulf States from a 
GDP perspective,26,27 whereas the UAE has an estimated GDP 
of $269 .8 billion and a GDP/capita of $29,900 (2013 estimate), 
which ranks the UAE second .26,28 The aforementioned, indicate 
that both states are wealthy and present a low risk of insuffi-
cient funding for the long-term investment of a civilian nuclear 
energy program .
Status of Newcomer States Seeking  
Civilian Nuclear Energy 
United Arab Emirates (UAE)
UAE’s Nuclear Program Specifications
The UAE was the first state in the Gulf region to construct 
nuclear reactors . As shown in Table 4, the four reactors are 
named Barakah 1, Barakah 2, Barakah 3, and Barakah 4 .22 Each 
of these reactors is an Advance Power Reactor APR1400, 
which is a light water reactor (LWR) that can produce 1,400 
megawatts of electricity (MWe) . The construction of the four 
reactors began in July 2012, May 2013, September 2014, and 
September 2015, and they are scheduled to be complete and 
operational by 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020 respectively . The 
total capacity of the first phase of the UAE’s civilian nuclear 
energy program will be 5,600 (MWe); a second phase has not 
been announced .
Table 4. UAE’s nuclear power reactors










Barakah 1, APR-1400 1400 July 2012 2017
Barakah 2, APR-1400 1400 May 2013 2018
Barakah 3, APR-1400 1400 Sep 2014 2019
Barakah 4, APR-1400 1400 Sep 2015 2020
 
Source: World Nuclear Association (2014), Nuclear Power in United Arab Emir-
ates.22
The four units will be supplied by a consortium that is led 
by the Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO) and includes 
Samsung, Westinghouse, Hyundai Engineering & Construc-
tion, Doosan Heavy Industries, and KEPCO Subsidiaries .22 
In addition, a domestic waste repository is an option for the 
UAE’s nuclear program for medium- and low-level waste, and a 
portion of the waste fuel will be sent to France for reprocess-
ing or to another country with a reprocessing plant . Studies on 
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a domestic geological repository are being conducted with a 
Swedish company .22
UAE’s Nuclear Program Strategy and Policy
The UAE government adopted a new model of approaching 
civilian nuclear energy that non-nuclear weapon states have ex-
plored since the Atoms for Peace speech in 1953 . This model 
attempts to ensure the confidence and support of the interna-
tional community for the peaceful development of UAE’s civil-
ian nuclear program .29 The UAE has shown the international 
community that it is only interested in peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy by adopting such models and signing various nonpro-
liferation agreements as shown in Table 5 . The UAE’s actions 
aligns with policies in the developed states for transferring ci-
vilian nuclear technology as well as with the high standard for 
nuclear nonproliferation that the international community aims 
to maintain .
Table 5. UAE’s nonproliferation activities
Agreement’s Name Date of Signature or 
Ratification
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 1995
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) 2003
Additional Protocol (AP) 2009
123 Agreement with the USA 2009
 
The above nonproliferation activities are limited; the list does not include 
all conventions .
By signing the 123 Agreement, the UAE pledged to import 
its nuclear fuel and forgo domestic fabrication, enrichment, and 
reprocessing plants . To this end, the UAE signed various long-
term contracts to import nuclear fuel from international firms 
at a fixed price .22 The UAE also announced that these reac-
tors would be operated through a joint venture with a foreign 
firm, with 60 percent ownership by the UAE government and 
40 percent by the foreign firm for a period of 60 years .22 Sub-
sequently, the UAE’s civilian nuclear program will rely on the 
international market for its nuclear fuel . 
The other nonproliferation steps considered by the UAE 
include the selection of LWR and the lack of reprocessing 
plants in the UAE’s territory . Developed states considered this 
approach to be an effective method for impeding the misuse 
of nuclear technology . Under normal operations, LWR does not 
produce high percentages of sensitive nuclear materials such 
as plutonium (239Pu), in comparison to other types of reactors, 
such as the fast breeder reactor (FBR) .30 LWRs have another 
proliferation-resistance feature: when refueling, the entire 
power plant must shut down, which enables easy monitoring 
of the NPPs by the IAEA .
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)
The KSA realized the need for nuclear technology in 1988 with 
the creation of the Atomic Energy Research Institute (AERI) in 
Riyadh .31,32 The AERI was the first nuclear institute in the Gulf 
region, and although it was established as a research base, the 
institute is now involved in many other activities . Initially, the 
AERI was responsible for researching nuclear technology re-
lated to aspects such as agriculture, industry and health . The 
initial responsibilities of the AERI included the representation 
of the KSA in the IAEA as well as the creation of the regula-
tory framework for nuclear energy in the KSA .33 The new city 
(KACARE) announced by the King in April 2010 is intended to 
expand the responsibilities of the AERI . KACARE will be re-
sponsible for the KSA’s civilian nuclear energy program and 
projects involving other renewable energy resources, including 
solar and wind energy projects . KACARE will serve as KSA’s 
representative to the IAEA . Since the inception of KACARE, the 
importance of achieving cooperation and agreement between 
KSA and other leading organizations has been acknowledged 
for the development of KACARE’s strategies, roadmaps and 
plans for civilian nuclear technology and other renewable en-
ergy resources .
KSA’s Nuclear Program Agreements and Cooperation
KACARE has sought cooperation with many of the developed 
states, and its achievements in terms of cooperation, which 
were determined according to newspaper reports and KA-
CARE’s website, include agreements with the following: 1) 
Areva, France; 2) Investigación Aplicada (INVAP), Argentina; 3) 
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), South Korea; 
4) China Nuclear Engineering Corporation (CNEC), China; 5) 
Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), Finland; 
6) Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation, Russia; and 6) 
Hungary .23 Prior to these cooperation agreements, the KSA had 
made several nonproliferation agreements, which are listed in 
Table 6 . The KSA signed the NPT in 1988, the CSA in 2009, and 
the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) in 2005; thus far, an AP has 
not been signed (without an AP, the IAEA cannot provide cred-
ible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material 
and activities) . The KSA signed a memorandum of understand-
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ing for nuclear energy with the United States in 2008, and the 
Taqnia Company (a Saudi company) set up a joint venture called 
“Invania” with INVAP (an Argentinian company) in 2015 to de-
velop nuclear technology for the KSA by focusing on small re-
actors, such as CAREM .23 The KSA has also engaged in various 
negotiations regarding nuclear energy technologies with coun-
tries such as the United States, Japan, the Czech Republic, and 
Britain; however, agreements have not been announced .
Table 6. KSA’s nonproliferation activities
Agreement’s Name Date of Signature or  
Ratification
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 1988
Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) 2005
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) 2009
Additional Protocol (AP) * -
 
* KSA has not yet signed the Additional Protocol (AP) .
The above nonproliferation activities are limited; the list does not include all 
conventions .
KSA’s Proposed Nuclear Capacity
KACARE announced that the initial capacity of the KSA’s nu-
clear program would be 17-18 gigawatt-electric (GWe), which 
should be achieved by 2032 .23 However, this estimate is mere-
ly the initial plan, and it is subject to change . In January 2015, 
KSA officials announced that the targeted nuclear capacity will 
more likely be achieved by 2040 .23 KACARE plans to construct 
approximately sixteen reactors by 2032 . If this initial plan is fol-
lowed, the first two reactors will be operating by approximately 
2022, and two reactors will subsequently be added each year 
until the completion of the sixteen reactors .34,35
KSA’s Proposed Nuclear Reactor Types 
The type of nuclear reactor to be used by KSA’s nuclear pro-
gram has not been officially announced, although information 
has been provided to newspapers and communicated via inter-
views with the president and the vice president of KACARE . 
The first reactor type considered by KACARE is the European 
Power Reactor (EPR), which is capable of producing up to 
1,650 MWe . The EPR is a third-generation pressurized water 
reactor .36 Other reactor types that have been considered are 
the AP1000, SMART, and CAREM . The AP1000, which was de-
signed by Westinghouse Company (a U .S . company), is a third-
generation-plus pressurized water reactor that is capable of 
producing between 1000 MWe and approximately 1200 MWe . 
SMART is a pressurized water reactor designed by KAERI, and 
it can generate up to 100 MWe, and CAREM is a small pressur-
ized water reactor designed by INVAP (an Argentinean compa-
ny), and it can generate approximately 25 MWe, which renders 
this type suitable for use as a research reactor (see Table 7) . 
The choice of LWRs for the KSA’s nuclear energy program is 
a smart option because of its proliferation-resistance features 
and reduced capacity to produce sensitive nuclear material . 
Table 7. The proposed nuclear reactor types in KSA
Reactor Name Reactor Type Electricity Production (MWe)
EPR Pressurized water reactor Up to 1,650 MWe
AP1000 Pressurized water reactor Up to 1,200 MWe
SMART Pressurized water reactor Up to 100 MWe
CAREM Pressurized water reactor Up to 25 MWe
KSA’s Proposed Nuclear Fuel Cycle
The president of KACARE has mentioned that KSA wants to be 
an independent producer of nuclear energy, which implies its 
involvement in the major stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, in-
cluding enrichment and fabrication . The KSA has not proposed 
plans to build a reprocessing plant; however, the sharing of 
such sensitive technology is limited because of the danger of 
using the separation technology to obtain “unirradiated direct 
use material,” which could be repurposed for military use . No 
official announcement or indicators regarding KSA’s proposed 
nuclear fuel cycle have been presented . Therefore, KSA’s nu-
clear fuel cycle may involve one of the following scenarios: 1) 
the KSA may obtain nuclear fuel from outside sources, which 
is similar to UAE’s nuclear fuel cycle; or 2) the KSA may build 
fabrication and enrichment plants . The first scenario would 
save time and increase the transparency of the KSA’s proposed 
nuclear program, whereas the second scenario would include 
mining, milling, enrichment, and fuel fabrication . If the KSA se-
lects this path, then the Additional Protocol (AP) will have to 
be signed to provide for higher transparency and enable the 
IAEA to provide credible assurance of the absence of unde-
clared nuclear materials and activities . If KSA is going to follow 
its initial nuclear plan (with its first reactors running by 2022), 
then nuclear fuel will have to be imported because building and 
operating fuel plants and manufacturing fuel represent long-
term investments . However, implementing these plans will 
require more time than building the reactor itself . Therefore, 
a combination of both the first and second scenario is likely . 
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Different Scenarios for Implementing 
Civilian Nuclear Energy
The implementation of civilian nuclear energy will initially re-
quire the use of highly developed approaches and strategies 
along with focused cooperation with developed states . From 
a nuclear technology perspective, developed states are those 
with advanced capabilities in reactor design and construction 
(R-D&C) as well as reactor operation and maintenance (R-
O&M) . Developed states are governed by strict rules regarding 
the transfer of civilian nuclear energy technology to newcomer 
states because of the high standard of nuclear nonproliferation 
that the international community attempts to maintain . Table 8 
describes the common scenarios based on current strategies 
and government agreements for implementing civilian nucle-
ar technology that have been observed since the Atoms for 
Peace speech in 1953 . 
  Each scenario (see Table 8) involves foreign and local con-
tributions . The advantage of the first scenario is that the country 
can implement a NPP in a short time to meet its increased elec-
tricity demands, although at a limited capability . The disadvan-
tages of the first scenario are that the state will not be able to 
design or construct its own reactor and it will slowly gain experi-
ence in reactor operation and maintenance over the short and 
medium term (ten to twenty years) . In the second scenario, the 
state will gain reasonable experience in reactor operation and 
maintenance early in the process and will gain capabilities for 
implementing most stages involved in reactor design and for 
performing full operations and maintenance . In the third sce-
nario, the state will be able to contribute to reactor design and 
construction from the beginning of the implementation process, 
and with time, the state will be able to design, construct, oper-
ate, and maintain its own reactors . The second and third sce-
narios are viable options for states with an INFCIRC/153-type 
safeguard agreement as long as an AP is enforced .
Nuclear Proliferation Concerns
Nuclear proliferation is an important global concern that led to 
the creation of the IAEA in 1957 .37 The initial mission of the 
IAEA was to control and promote peaceful nuclear technology 
via the development of the necessary legal frameworks, regu-
lations and legislation .37 The global concern later resulted also 
in the NPT and Safeguards Agreements (CSA) to be concluded 
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R-D&C   
100 percent
R-O&M        
70-90 percent
R-D&C       
0 percent
R-O&M        
10-30 percent
R-D&C        
60-75 percent
R-O&M   
<70 percent
R-D&C        
25-40 percent




and Involvement  
Percentage percent
R-O&M   
70-90 percent
R-O&M   
~10-30 percent
R-D&C           
>70 percent
R-O&M          
<30 percent
R-D&C           
<30 percent
R-O&M          
>70 percent
R-D&C    
~30 percent
R-O&M   
<5 percent
R-D&C    
~70 percent
R-O&M   
>95 percent
Long Term
(more than 20 years)  
and Involvement  
Percentage percent
R-O&M     
30-70 percent
R-O&M        
30-70 percent
R-D&C           
<10 percent
Special Supplies and 
Consultant            
<5 percent
R-D&C           
>90 percent
R-O&M          
>95 percent
Special Supplies  
and Consultant     
<5 percent
R-D&C    
>95 percent
R-O&M   
>95 percent
Comments: Depends on 
the states’ strategies and 
legal agreements.
1- State will find it difficult to contribute to 
R-D&C.
2- State can provide limited contributions to 
R-O&M.
1- State will find it easy to contribute to 
R-D&C and may face challenges (in the short-
to-medium term) in conducting its own R-D&C.
2- State can fully contribute to R-O&M.
1- State can provide a greater contribution to 
R-D&C and will be able to conduct its own 
R-D&C.
2- State can fully contribute to R-O&M.
A, Adoption of UAE’s civilian nuclear model
B, Adoption of China’s civilian nuclear model
C, Adoption of South Korea’s civilian nuclear model
Table 8. Different scenarios for implementing civilian nuclear energy
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by non-nuclear-weapon states with the IAEA, which were fol-
lowed by the AP in 1997 .38-40 The CSA is an agreement that 
attempts to implement a verification method for assuring that 
states comply with their obligations at all nuclear facilities with-
in their territory and for preventing diversions of nuclear mate-
rial from peaceful purposes to military uses .38,39
The AP was adopted by the IAEA in 1997 after the com-
mencement of the clandestine Iraqi nuclear weapon program . 
The AP is an additional agreement for strengthening and im-
proving the CSA by stipulating that states provide additional in-
formation on their nuclear programs and clarification as needed 
to support IAEA inspectors and allow access to their nuclear 
facilities as well as any location specified by the IAEA .40
Sensitive Nuclear Plants and Materials
An NPP is not considered to be sufficient for proliferation; 
however, the fuel cycle process is considered the primary pa-
rameter for proliferation .31,38 The most important processes in 
the fuel cycle are enrichment, fuel fabrication and reprocessing 
plants, and the knowledge required to separate isotopes, en-
hance specific isotope concentrations, and convert compounds 
from one phase to another may be employed for military pur-
poses . These plants are central to the proliferation concerns of 
developed states . The nuclear materials that cause the great-
est proliferation concerns are: Pu, 233U and highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) (235U 20 percent) when applied for direct use; 
and thorium and U (235U <20 percent) when applied for indirect 
use .38 However, the special nuclear materials 239Pu, 233U and 
HEU 235U have received special attention31,38 because these 
nuclear materials (see Table 9) are associated with a quantity 
that is sufficient to produce a single nuclear bomb .38 
Double Standard Argument
All of the developed states have formed their own procedures 
for cooperation when transferring peaceful nuclear technology 
using official government agreements . One of the best exam-
ples of a highly evaluated agreement is the 123 Agreement 
used by the United States . This agreement entails thorough 
evaluations of sensitive nuclear materials, equipment, and fa-
cilities by isolating sensitive nuclear plants, such as fuel fabrica-
tion, enrichment and reprocessing plants .41 The disadvantages 
of the 123 Agreement include the variations observed in the 
agreement from state to state, which could reflect a double 
standard . The U .S .-UAE 123 Agreement clearly stated that the 
UAE must forgo the right to implement fuel fabrication, enrich-
ment and reprocessing plants, which was also stated in Presi-
dent Obama’s letter to Congress in the context of the U .S .-UAE 
123 Agreement .41 The following statements will provide addi-
tional details on the U .S .-UAE 123 Agreement:
First:
“The United States and the UAE are entering into it in 
the context of a stated intention by the UAE to rely on 
existing international markets for nuclear fuel services 
as an alternative to the pursuit of enrichment and 
reprocessing. Article 7 will transform this UAE policy into 
a legally binding obligation from the UAE to the United 
States upon entry into force of the Agreement.”
Second:
“In view of these and other nonproliferation features, the 
Agreement has the potential to serve as a model for other 
countries in the region that wish to pursue responsible 
nuclear energy development.”
Third:
“Confirmation by the United States that the fields of co-
operation, terms, and conditions accorded by the United 
States to the UAE shall be no less favorable in scope and 
effect than those that the United States may accord to 
any other non-nuclear-weapon State in the Middle East in 
a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement.”
Obviously, the United States, as represented by the 
Obama administration, has a special model for the MENA re-
gion, which is reflected in the new 123 Agreement with the 
UAE signed in 2009 . However, the United States confirmed 
Material Significant Quantity
Direct Use Material
Plutonium  8 kg
U-233 8 kg
U-235 in HEU 25 kg of contained U-235
Indirect Use Material
U-235 in LEU
75 kg of contained U-235, 10 t of 
natural uranium or 20 t of  
depleted uranium.
Thorium 20 t
Table 9. Significant quantities for sensitive nuclear materials
Source: IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition, International  
Nuclear Verification Series No. 3.
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that other states in the Middle East region will not receive any 
favorable arrangements in terms of cooperation, conditions, 
and context in 123 Agreements . In other words, the United 
States is not willing to share enrichment and fuel fabrication 
knowledge to any interested nation in the Middle East .41 How-
ever, the U .S .-Vietnam 123 Agreement signed in 2014 did not 
clearly state that Vietnam must forgo the right to implement 
these sensitive plants .42 Thus, the newcomer states in the 
MENA region must carefully evaluate the available international 
nuclear cooperation agreements to determine the most suit-
able agreement for their nuclear program .
Conclusions 
This paper attempts to analyze the newcomer states to the 
MENA region seeking civilian nuclear energy, primarily the KSA 
and UAE, by investigating their political and economic situa-
tions, including their motivations and funding resources . More-
over, this study attempts to clarify a number of the major and 
initial difficulties that would be faced by both states . Because 
of the rapid increases in population growth and the increasing 
needs for desalination plants and demands for electricity, both 
states have begun to evaluate and implement nuclear energy . 
Both states are politically and economically stable, which are 
validated by: 1) the governmental systems maintaining stabil-
ity throughout the history of crises in the MENA region and 
2) the states maintaining economic stability through the high 
daily revenue resulting from oil and gas production, huge oil 
reserves and high GDP and GDP/capita .
Newcomer states that seek to implement civilian nuclear 
energy programs can achieve this objective within a reason-
able time frame with the cooperation and support of developed 
states, which can be secured by official government agree-
ments . The international community takes all activities involv-
ing nuclear technology seriously to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear technology . Thus, newcomer states must demonstrate 
that they will use nuclear technology peacefully and convince 
the international community of their benign intent by following 
the established high standard of nonproliferation and adopting 
well-developed approaches, strategies and policies for their ci-
vilian nuclear program . For newcomer states, LWRs are the 
preferred type of reactor because of the following: 1) the pro-
duction of large quantities of sensitive nuclear materials are 
not encouraged, 2) the production of sensitive materials can 
be easily controlled, and 3) the proliferation-resistance features 
facilitate simple inspections by IAEA inspectors . 
Regarding the fuel cycle, developed states prefer new-
comer states to import nuclear fuel to eliminate the risk of new-
comer states obtaining fuel fabrication and enrichment technol-
ogy . A double standard is arguably imposed with respect to the 
fuel cycle for nuclear programs, which is reflected in certain 
international nuclear agreements, such as the U .S .-UAE 123 
Agreement and the U .S .-Vietnam 123 Agreement . The stan-
dard imposed in these agreements varies from state to state 
depending on the political relations and situations between the 
newcomer states and developed states . The establishment of 
fabrication, enrichment, and reprocessing plants is associated 
with the potential use of sensitive nuclear materials and the 
knowledge required for nuclear military applications . All leading 
states in the nuclear field are obligated to limit the sharing of 
their knowledge on sensitive nuclear materials and plants be-
cause such knowledge may lead to nuclear military applications 
unless the materials are subject to IAEA safeguards . Thus, af-
ter the general approach and strategy for implementing a civil-
ian nuclear energy program is established, the best standard 
for the specific newcomer state must be determined .
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